34.00
DAMAGES--FUTURE DAMAGES--LENGTH OF TIME DAMAGES WILL
CONTINUE--DISCOUNT OF DAMAGES--MORTALITY TABLES
34.01 Damages Arising in the Future--Extent and Amount
If you find that [a] [the] plaintiff is entitled to damages arising in the future [because of
injuries] [or] [because of future (medical) (caretaking) expenses] [or] [because of loss of
earnings] [or] [loss of the services of [name of minor child]] [or] [because of (loss of society)
(or) (loss of companionship and sexual relations)], you must determine the amount of these
damages which will arise in the future. [If these damages are of a continuing nature, you may
consider how long they will continue.] [If these damages are permanent in nature, then in
computing these damages you may consider how long the plaintiff (and his spouse) (is) (are)
likely to live.] [With respect to a loss of future earnings, you may consider that some persons
work all their lives and others do not; that a person's earnings may remain the same or may
increase or decrease in the future.]
Notes on Use
The elements of damages used in the first paragraph of this instruction must be consistent
with the elements of damages used in other damages instructions, e.g., IPI 30.06-30.09, 31.13,
and 32.02-32.04.
This instruction is intended to inform the jury that they should consider the length of time
the various elements of damage will continue, point out that earnings may not equal life
expectancy and may vary, and lay the basis for the instruction on discounting particular elements
of damages to present cash value. See IPI 34.02.
The instruction is drawn to cover both temporary and permanent future damages. If there
is evidence to support a finding that future damages are continuing but not permanent, use the
first sentence of the second paragraph. If there is evidence sufficient to support a finding that
future damages are permanent, use the second sentence of the second paragraph. Buskirk v.
Burlington N., Inc., 103 Ill.App.3d 414, 431 N.E.2d 410, 412, 59 Ill.Dec. 125, 127 (5th
Dist.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910, 103 S.Ct. 217, 74 L.Ed.2d 173 (1982). If the evidence
would support both findings, both sentences should be used.
The last paragraph will be used only when there is evidence of a loss of future earnings.
If mortality tables are in evidence, also use IPI 34.04.
On the issue of the use of “value” or “expense” for medical care, treatment and services,
see 30.06 Notes on Use.
Comment
See Comment to IPI 32.06 concerning the parent's right to recover for the loss of the
services of an unemancipated minor child.
34.02 Damages Arising in the Future--Discount to Present Cash Value
In computing the damages arising in the future [because of future (medical) (caretaking)
expenses] [or] [because of the loss of (future earnings) (benefits) (or) (services)] you must
determine their present cash value. “Present cash value” means the sum of money needed now,
which, when added to what that sum may reasonably be expected to earn in the future, will equal
the amount of the [expenses] [and] [earnings] [benefits] at the time in the future when [the
expenses must be paid] [or] [the earnings (benefits) would have been received]. Damages for
[pain and suffering] [disability] [loss of a normal life] [and] [disfigurement] [loss of (society)
(companionship) (and) (sexual relations)] are not reduced to present cash value.
Notes on Use
This instruction may be used with IPI 34.01. If mortality tables are in evidence, also use
IPI 34.04.
On the issue of the use of “value” or “expense” for medical care, treatment and services,
see 30.06 Notes on Use.
Comment
This instruction has been modified from earlier versions. Prior 34.02 included the phrase
“... you must not [simply multiply the (expenses) (earnings) (benefits) (by the length of time you
have found they will continue) (or) (by the number of years you have found that the plaintiff is
likely to live)].”
Inclusion of this phrase requires the court to favor one method of determining present
cash value over another. There is a sound economic basis (though certainly not the only one) that
permits present cash value to be determined in exactly the manner prohibited by the former
instruction. This is known as the “total offset method.” See Beaubien v. Elliot, 434 P.2d 665
(Alaska 1967) and Kaczkawski v. Bolubasz, 461 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980), wherein two
state supreme courts have judicially adopted this method. Also see 104 Dick. L. Rev. 679
(Summer 2000). The Illinois Supreme Court in Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill.2d 98, 676
N.E.2d 621, 221 Ill.Dec. 818 (1997) approved of this method of determining present cash value
in the “upper bound” figures used by plaintiff's expert. However, the Court did not adopt this
method or indicate it was preferred over other methods. Therefore, the committee makes no
recommendation as to which of several methods may be used to determine present cash value.
Future damages except for pain and suffering, disfigurement, disability, loss of normal
life, and loss of society and consortium are to be reduced to present cash value. Allendorf v.
Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 8 Ill.2d 164, 133 N.E.2d 288 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833, 77 S.Ct.
49, 1 L.Ed.2d 53 (1956); Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N.E.2d 57 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 753, 65 S.Ct. 82, 89 L.Ed. 603 (1944); Howard v. Gulf, M. & O.R.Co., 13 Ill.App.2d
482, 142 N.E.2d 825 (4th Dist.1957). Cf. Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 1060, 522
N.E.2d 1352, 119 Ill.Dec. 493 (1st Dist.1988), and Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Air Illinois, Inc., 167
Ill.App.3d 1081, 522 N.E.2d 146, 118 Ill.Dec. 691 (1st Dist.1988) and Drews v. Globel Freight
Lines, Inc., 144 Ill.2d 84, 161 Ill.Dec. 324, 578 N.E.2d 970 (1991) (damages for loss of
consortium and society not reduced to present cash value in a wrongful death case).
There is no requirement that actuarial or statistical evidence be present to guide the jury
in its determination of present cash value when this instruction is given. Robinson v. Greeley &
Hansen, 114 Ill.App.3d 720, 449 N.E.2d 250, 253; 70 Ill.Dec. 376, 379 (2d Dist.1983); Crabtree
v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 89 Ill.App.3d 35, 411 N.E.2d 19, 44 Ill.Dec. 113 (5th Dist.1980); Kirk v.
Walter E. Deuchler Associates, Inc., 79 Ill.App.3d 416, 426-427; 398 N.E.2d 603, 610; 34
Ill.Dec. 780, 787 (2d Dist.1979).
See also Schaffner v. Chicago & North Western. Transportation Company, 129 Ill.2d 1,
541 N.E.2d 643, 133 Ill.Dec. 432 (1989) (improper for defendant to argue that any sum awarded
Plaintiff could be invested to produce a “stream of income”); Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc., 168
Ill.App.3d 1060, 522 N.E.2d 1352, 1356; 119 Ill.Dec. 493, 497 (1st Dist.1988) (expert testimony
as to cost of annuity properly excluded on issue of present cash value); Singh v. Air Illinois, Inc.,
165 Ill.App.3d 923, 520 N.E.2d 852, 856-857; 117 Ill.Dec. 501, 505-506 (1st Dist.1988) (same);
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Air Illinois, Inc., 167 Ill.App.3d 1081, 522 N.E.2d 146, 150-151; 118
Ill.Dec. 691, 695-696 (1st Dist.1988) (same; reference to “inflation” in closing argument not
prejudicial error)
34.03 Death Case--Discount of Future Damages
Comment
This instruction is now IPI 31.12.
34.04 Damages Arising in the Future--Mortality Tables as Evidence of Damages--Injury
Case
According to a table of mortality in evidence, the life expectancy of a person aged ____
years is ____ years. This figure is not conclusive. It is the average life expectancy of persons
who have reached the age of ____. It may be considered by you in connection with other
evidence relating to the probable life expectancy of the plaintiff in this case, including evidence
of his occupation, health, habits, and other activities, bearing in mind that some persons live
longer and some persons less than the average.
Notes on Use
The age of the injured person at the time of the trial and the expectancy of a person of his
age as shown by the mortality tables in evidence should be inserted in the blank spaces in this
instruction.
If mortality tables are in evidence, this instruction should be given in addition to any
other instructions on the calculation of damages, such as IPI 34.01 or 34.02.
Comment
Mortality tables are admissible in evidence in personal injury cases where there is
evidence that the injuries are of a permanent nature. Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N.E.2d
57 (1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 753, 65 S.Ct. 82, 89 L.Ed. 603 (1944); Howard v. Gulf, M. &
O.R. Co., 13 Ill.App.2d 482, 142 N.E.2d 825 (4th Dist.1957).
In Avance v. Thompson, supra, the Illinois Supreme Court held that: “The jury should be
carefully instructed as to the purposes for which such tables may be considered in fixing
pecuniary damages.” The court indicated that it was the responsibility of the party offering the
tables to accompany the offer with a proper instruction to the jury. In Nickell v. Baltimore &
O.R. Co., 347 Ill.App. 202, 210; 106 N.E.2d 738, 741-742 (4th Dist.1952), the defendant
contended that the court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on the
application of mortality tables which had been introduced into evidence by the plaintiff. The
court held it was incumbent upon the defendant to make a request for an instruction relative to
the application of mortality tables and that it was not reversible error for the court to fail to
instruct on this subject in the absence of tender of such an instruction. Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 366(b) (2) (i) states, “No party may raise on appeal the failure to give an instruction unless
he shall have tendered it.”
In Crabtree v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 89 Ill.App.3d 35, 39; 411 N.E.2d 19, 22;
44 Ill.Dec. 113, 116 (5th Dist.1980), the court, in rejecting an objection to IPI 34.04, noted that
there is no requirement in Illinois that plaintiff introduce actuarial or statistical evidence to guide
the jury in determining the present cash value of future lost earnings, although such evidence is
“often helpful to juries in reducing damages to monetary figures and could have been presented
by defendant had it felt the necessity therefor.”
This instruction has been approved in various cases. Jurney v. Lubeznik, 72 Ill.App.2d
117, 218 N.E.2d 799, 806 (1st Dist.1966); Sherman v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill.App.2d 391,
401; 250 N.E.2d 537, 546 (4th Dist.1969); Avery v. Moews Seed Corn Co., 131 Ill.App.2d 842,
268 N.E.2d 561 (3d Dist.1971); Canales v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 92 Ill.App.3d 773, 416
N.E.2d 303, 48 Ill.Dec. 272 (1st Dist.1981); Ciborowski v. Philip Dressler & Associates, 110
Ill.App.3d 981, 443 N.E.2d 618, 66 Ill.Dec. 692 (1st Dist.1982); Martin v. Kralis Poultry Co., 12
Ill.App.3d 453, 465; 297 N.E.2d 610, 619 (5th Dist.1973).
This instruction was previously an alternative to IPI 34.01 or 34.02 but is now given in
addition to those instructions or any other instructions referring to mortality tables.
34.05 Mortality Tables as Evidence of Damages--Death Case
Comment
This instruction is now IPI 31.13.